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Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.: A Limitation on
Recovery of Consequential Damages in an
Electronic Fund Transfer
An electronic fund transfer is defined as the replacement of a paper
order, promise of payment, or credit with an electronically-generated
message.I The term encompasses an infinite variety of payment systems 2
that include either interbank transfers or transfers between banks and
consumers. 3 The increasing utilization of electronic fund transfers by
financial institutions facilitates commercial transactions but also creates
problems for courts and legislators who attempt to develop sound and
consistent laws governing electronic fund transfers. 4 In Evra Corp. v. Swiss
Bank Corp. 5, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced the question of
whether a bank was liable for consequential damages resulting from its
failure to transfer payment in accordance with a telex request. The Sev-
enth Circuit relied on the common-law rule of Hadley v. Baxenda/e6 and
held that the bank was not liable for consequential damages because the
plaintiff failed to notify it of the special circumstances giving rise to the
damage.
*Hyman-Michaels Company (Hyman-Michaels), 7 an Illinois corpo-
ration, chartered a ship, the Pandora, to deliver scrap metal to a Brazilian
corporation." The charter provided for a fixed daily rate payable semi-
monthly in advance to the account of the Pandora's owner at the Banque
Brandel & Oliff, The Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A Prtimer, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 531, 532
(1979).
2 The well-known automated teller machine [ATM] is one type of electronic fund trans-
fer. Another type is the processing of preauthorized payments and credits, which is generally
accomplished through Automatic Clearinghouses [ACHs]. The oldest electronic fund transfer is
the wire transfer that is utilized by financial institutions to transfer funds between bank ac-
counts. Id at 532-35.
3 See id at 532 n.5.
4 Farley, "Dialingfor Dollars"--Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, 37 U. Prr. L. REv. 613,
614-15 (1976).
5 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 377 (1982).
6 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
7 Hyman-Michaels Company was engaged in buying and selling scrap metal. In 1976, it
sold its business to Azcon Corporation and changed its name to Evra Corporation. 522 F. Supp.
820, 823 (N.D. I1. 1981).
8 Hyman-Michaels entered into a two-year written contract with the Brazilian corpora-
tion. The contract provided that the purchaser could decline to purchase the scrap metal if the
price exceeded a certain amount. Id
104 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Banque de Paris) in Geneva, Switzerland. 9 The
charter further provided that if Hyman-Michaels failed to pay in ad-
vance, the Pandora's owner could cancel the charter.10
Hyman-Michaels generally made payment by requesting its bank,
The Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago
(Continental), to make a wire transfer of the funds. Continental trans-
ferred the funds by sending a telex message to its London office for re-
transmission to its correspondent bank, the Swiss Bank Corporation
(Swiss Bank). 1  Swiss Bank then deposited the funds in the ship owner's
account at the Banque de Paris.
On the morning of April 25, 1973, Hyman-Michaels telephoned
Continental and requested it to transfer payment to the Banque de Paris
for the charter period from April 27 to May 11.12 Continental's London
office received the telex from the Chicago office and on April 26, at-
tempted for an hour to retransmit the message to Swiss Bank's general
telex number. The attempts were unsuccessful, and the London operator
diverted the message to another machine in Swiss Bank's Foreign Ex-
change Department. Swiss Bank took no action on the request and on
April 27, the Pandora's owner cancelled the charter.1 3 Hyman-Michaels
did not attempt to rewire the funds, but instructed Continental to keep
trying to effect payment. Five days passed while the parties searched
unsuccessfully for the missing telex.1 4 Finally, Continental retransmitted
the telex message and on May 2, Swiss Bank attempted to deposit the
funds at the Banque de Paris. The Pandora's owner refused to accept
payment.
After an arbitration panel concluded that the Pandora's ownerwas
entitled to cancel the contract,1 5 Hyman-Michaels brought a diversity
9 The charter was for one year, with two successive six-month options exercisable by Hy-
man-Michaels. Id.
10 Id. at 823. When the parties entered into the charter, market charter rates were low.
Soon after the contract was signed, however, the market rates began to climb. Id. at 824. Thus,
the Pandora's owner was anxious to find a way out of the charter.
I IId at 823-24. A correspondent bank is a bank which 'regularly performs services for
another [bank] in a place or market to which the other does not have a direct access." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 311 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979).
12 522 F. Supp. 820, 824 (N.D. Il. 1981).
13 No one knows what happened to the telex request. After diverting the message to the
number in the Foreign Exchange Department, the London operator received an "answer-back"
with a clear copy of the message, indicating that Swiss Bank received the telex. The Foreign
Exchange Department received an average of three to four telexes per week which were actually
destined for other departments. Swiss Bank had no procedure for insuring that these requests
were promptly acted upon. It is possible that the machine continued to receive messages with-
out recording them since the machine did not automatically shut off when it ran out of paper.
It is also possible that the operator who received the message failed to act on it. Id. at 824-25.
14 Id. at 825-26. No action was taken by the parties on Saturday, April 28 or Sunday,
April 29. Id. at 826.
15 The parties had already referred one disagreement to arbitration in October 1972. In-
stead of the usual wire transfer, Hyman-Michaels had mailed a check from Chicago the day
before the funds were due at the Banque de Paris. When the check did not arrive in time, the
Pandora's owner cancelled the charter. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of Hyman-Michaels
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suit against Swiss Bank in the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.1 6 Hyman-Michaels based its claim against Swiss Bank on
breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.' 7 Hyman-
Michaels sought damages for its expenses in the arbitration proceeding
and its lost profits due to the cancellation of the charter.",
The district court first determined that Illinois law applied to the
case. 19 The court then dealt with plaintiffs breach of contract claim by
analogizing Swiss Bank's role as a correspondent bank to the concept of a
collecting bank under the Uniform Commercial Code.20 Under U.C.C.
§ 4-201, a collecting bank's agency status with respect to the owner of an
item is presumed prior to the final settlement of the item.2 1 Based on this
analogy, the court concluded that Swiss Bank was plaintiffs agent and
owed plaintiff the same duty of care as if there had been an express con-
tract.2 2 Relying on the Illinois standard of negligence, the court deter-
mined that Swiss Bank owed a duty of care to plaintiff to maintain a
reliable system of receiving telex messages, and that Swiss Bank had
breached that duty.2 3 The court rejected Swiss Bank's argument that
three or four diverted messages per week was not sufficient notice of the
potential risk involved to customers such as Hyman-Michaels. Conclud-
ing that the lost profits incurred by Hyman-Michaels were foreseeable by
because the Pandora's.owner had given Hyman-Michaels no warning that it was cancelling the
charter. The panel, however, put Hyman-Michaels on notice that the payment provision would
be strictly enforced thereafter. Id at 824. The second arbitration panel regarded Hyman-
Michaels as blameless until April 27, when Hyman-Michaels learned that the Pandora's owner
had cancelled the charter. The District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed
the arbitration decision. Id at 826.
16 Id at 822. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1980). Id. at 826.
17 Id. After Hyman-Michaels filed its original complaint against Swiss Bank, Swiss Bank
joined Continental as a third-party defendant, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Continental
and Hyman-Michaels then filed claims against each other, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)
and 14. Id at 822-23. This note is limited to Hyman-Michaels' claim against Swiss Bank.
18 In March 1973, the price of the scrap metal rose and the Brazilian corporation elected
not to buy from Hyman-Michaels. Hyman-Michaels immediately subchartered the vessel at
the higher charter rates. The lost profits are based on the difference between the charter and
subcharter rates. Id. at 824.
19 Id. at 827. This note does not address the controversial choice of law issue.
20 The Code was adopted in Illinois at the 1961 Regular Session of the General Assembly.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 1-101 to 1-108 (Smith-Hurd 1978). Under the U.C.C., the sepa-
rate categories of banks are defined as follows: A "collecting bank" means "any bank handling
the item for collection except the payor bank." A "payor bank" means "a bank by which an
item is payable as drawn or accepted." An "intermediary bank" means "any bank to which an
item is transferred in course of collection except the depositary or payor bank." A "depositary
bank" means "the first bank to which an item is transferred for collection even though it is also
the payor bank." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 4-105. Technically, the more correct analogy would
have been to an intermediary bank since Swiss Bank could not be analogous either to a deposi-
tary or payor bank. The analogy is not exactly on point since the methods of collection and
payment under the U.C.C. and under the electronic fund transfers are different. See infra note
55 and accompanying text.
21 Under U.C.C. § 4-104(g) an "item" is defined as "any instrument for the payment of
money even though it is not negotiable but does not include money."
22 522 F. Supp. at 828.
23 Id at 828-29.
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Swiss Bank, the court awarded Hyman-Michaels damages exceeding
$2.1 million. 24
In reversing the award of damages, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals avoided the choice of law dilemma, stating that since Swiss
Bank was not liable under Illinois law, the choice of law made no differ-
ence to the outcome of the case.2 5 Relying on the principles of Hadley v.
Baxendale26 and the common-law doctrine of avoidable consequences, the
court denied Hyman-Michaels' recovery of damages. The court also re-
fused to apply the U.C.C. either directly or by analogy. 2 7 The court
cited the Illinois case of Siegal v. Westem Union Telegraph Co. 28 as an appli-
cation of the Hadley rule. In Siegal, plaintiff sued Western Union for
$1,450 lost profits when Western Union negligently misdirected a $200
money order that plaintiff intended to use to bet legally on a horse. The
court held that under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, Western Union was
not liable because it had no notice or knowledge of the purpose for which
the money was to be used. 29
The court recognized that in Siegal and Hadley there was a contract
between the parties, and that in Evra there was no express contract be-
tween Hyman-Michaels and Swiss Bank. 30 The court then addressed the
issue of whether the absence of an express contract in Evra would make
any difference in the application of the Hadley rule. The court recog-
nized that since tort liability is generally broader than contract liability,
Swiss Bank should be liable in tort for a broader set of consequences than
if it had only broken a contract. 3 1 Rejecting the distinction between con-
tract and tort liability, however, the court concluded that Slegal was au-
thority for holding Swiss Bank not liable for the consequences of
24 Id. at 829, 833-35. The court also ruled that Swiss Bank was not entitled to indemnifi-
cation from Continental. Id at 831. The court held that Hyman-Michaels was not barred from
recovery due to contributory negligence. Id The court also ruled that Hyman-Michaels had no
claim against Continental. Id. at 832.
25 673 F.2d at 955.
26 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). The basic rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is that conse-
quential damages are only recoverable if they arose naturally from the breach or if they were
within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. For a discussion of
the principles set out in Hadley, see supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
27 673 F.2d at 955. The Evra court cited the case of Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979), to support its refusal to apply the U.C.C.
either directly or by analogy. 673 F.2d at 955. Actually, the Ddbrueck court did not state that
the U.C.C. did not apply at all to electronic fund transfers; the court applied the U.C.C. by
analogy. Id. at 1051. See thfa text accompanying notes 64-69.
28 312 Il. App. 86, 37 N.E.2d 868 (1941).
29 Id at 95-96, 37 N.E.2d at 871-72. The suit in Stgal was predicated on a tariff regula-
tion that limited the recovery of damages for delay, nonpayment, or underpayment of a money
order due to negligence to $500. Plaintiff attempted to argue that the provision was a liqui-
dated damages provision, but the court construed the regulation as a limitation on the liability
of the company. The court, therefore, held that the tariff regulation did not override the com-
mon-law rule that special damages can only be recovered when the special damages were within
the contemplation of the parties. Id
30 673 F.2d at 956.
31 Id
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negligently failing to transfer the funds.32 The Evra court reasoned that
in Siegal, Western Union had not only broken its contract to deliver the
plaintiffs money order, but had negligently misdirected the money order
as well. The court concluded that since the Siegal court did not hold
Western Union liable for the broader tort set of consequences even
though it was negligent, Swiss Bank likewise was not liable for the conse-
quences of negligently failing to transfer the funds.33
The court applied the common-law doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences to further support the denial of recovery. 34 The doctrine pro-
vides that a plaintiff may not recover for harm which he might
reasonably have avoided. The court stated that since a first arbitration
panel had put Hyman-Michaels on notice that the payment provisions of
the charter would be strictly enforced, Hyman-Michaels acted impru-
dently in waiting until the day before payment was due to instruct Con-
tinental to transfer the funds.35 The court found that Hyman-Michaels
also acted imprudently in not attempting to send payment to the Banque
de Paris immediately after it realized the. telex had been lost.36 The
court added that the result might have been different, and the charter
not cancelled, had Hyman-Michaels not wasted five days while Conti-
nental and Swiss Bank searched for the missing telex. 37 Linking the con-
cept of foreseeability of damages found in Hadley v. Baxendale to the same
concept in tort, the court concluded that the circumstances leading to the
injury suffered by Hyman-Michaels were too remote from Swiss Bank's
practical range of knowledge. 38 Swiss Bank was not required to take
elaborate precautions or insure against a harm that it could not measure
or reasonably be expected to know about, but that was known with pre-
cision by Hyman-Michaels. 39
The court rejected plaintiffs argument that two earlier Illinois cases,
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Lathrop 40 and Providence- Washington Insurance
Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 41 compelled recovery of consequential
damages. In Lathrop, a coffee dealer engaged in buying and selling fu-
tures contracts sent a telegram. directing his broker to buy 1000 bags of
32 Id. at 956-57.
33 Id at 957.
34 Id.
35 Id See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
36 673 F.2d at 957.
37 Id.
38 Id at 957-58. "To estimate the extent of its probable liability in order to know how
many and how elaborate [sic] fail-safe features to install in its telex rooms or how much insur.
ance to buy against the inevitable failures, Swiss Bank would have to collect reams of informa-
tion about firms that are not even its regular customers." Id at 958.
39 "The sender can protect himself by insurance in one form or another if the risk of
nondelivery or error appears to be great . . . . The [telegraph] company, if it takes out insur-
ance for itself, can do no more than guess at the loss to be avoided. 673 F.2d at 958-59 (quoting
Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 245 N.Y. 284, 291-92, 157 N.E. 140, 142 (1927)).
44 131 Il1. 575, 23 N.E. 583 (1890).
41 247 Ill. 84, 93 N.E. 134 (1910).
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coffee, but the telegraph company changed the message to 2000 bags.
The price of coffee fell, and the dealer sued the telegraph company for
the loss. In Providence- Washington, a telegram from an insurance company
cancelling a policy was misdirected, and the insurance company was.lia-
ble on the policy due to a fire. In both cases, the court held that the
companies had sufficient notice to be liable for consequential damages
under Hadley v. Baxendale. The Evra court distinguished the two cases by
stating that in the prior cases the defendants had more information and
the plaintiffs could not take their own precaution against the mistakes.
42
Reasoning that Hyman-Michaels was a sophisticated business enterprise
that should take its own precaution against risk of loss, the court held
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was not entitled to recovery.
43
To understand the court's reliance on the common-law rule in Had-
1ey and the significance of the court's decision, it is necessary to examine
the development of the law governing electronic fund transfers. There
has been a significant amount of legislation concerning electronic fund
transfers, but none of the legislation is applicable to the facts of Evra. In
1981 Congress enacted the Electronics Fund Transfer Act,44 which gov-
erns the rights and liabilities of both consumers and providers of transfer
services. The act, however, excludes interbank transactions and transac-
tions that service large corporate customers. 45 Several states, including
Illinois, have enacted laws governing electronic fund transfers, but these
also exclude interbank transactions. 46  Federal regulations that govern
interbank transfers are limited to the use of the Federal Reserve Commu-
nications System. 47
A few commentators have suggested that Articles 3 and 4 of the
U.C.C. may be applied directly to electronic fund transfers to determine
the rights and liabilities of the parties. 48 Article 3, entitled "Commercial
Paper" and Article 4, entitled "Bank Deposits and Collections," govern
the rights and liabilities of parties to check payment transactions. The
argument for applying these provisions of the U.C.C. is based on the
assumption that an "item" as defined in § 4.-104(l)(g) of the Code in-
cludes not only paper transactions but electronic fund transfers as well.
49
According to U.C.C. § 4-104(l)(g) an "item" is "any instrument for the
payment of money even though it is not negotiable but does not include
42 673 F.2d at 959.
43 Id The judgment in favor of Continental on Hyman-Michael's counterclaim was af-
firmed. Id. at 960.
44 Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728-41 (1978)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-93r (Supp. V 1981)).
45 See id § 1693a.
46 See, e.g., Electronic Fund Transfer Transmission Facility Act, §§ 1-100 to 14-100, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 17, §§ 1301-1360 (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp. 1982).
47 See Federal Reserve Board Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210.1 (1982) (limiting application
of interbank transfer regulations to collection by Federal Reserve Banks).
48 See, e.g., Clarke, An Item is an Item is an Item. Artcle 4 of the UCC and the Electronic Age,
25 Bus. LAW. 109 (1969).49 1d at 111-12.
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money."
50
The majority of commentators have argued against the direct appli-
cation of the U.C.C. to situations involving electronic fund transfers.5'
Professor Hal S. Scott of Harvard Law School has noted that "[i]t is not
the rather prosaic technical question as to whether an 'item is an item,'
within the meaning of§ 4 -104 (g) . . . . If that were indeed a problem it
could be corrected with a simple stroke of a pen."'52  The underlying
problem, as he points out, is that the heart of the U.C.C. is the paper
item, and there are many issues raised by electronic fund transfers that
are not addressed by Articles 3 and 4. For instance, under Article 3, a
party's rights and liabilities often depend on whether the party falls
within ascriptive definitions such as "transferee", "holder", or "holder-
in-due-course". 53 Under Article 4, a customer has the right to stop pay-
ment on a check before final payment is complete, but with many elec-
tronic fund transfer systems, the payment is complete at the time of the
transaction. 54 If Article 4 is applied strictly, the customer would have no
opportunity to stop payment. 5
5
A third problem encountered in attempting to apply the U.C.C. di-
rectly to electronic fund transfers is that the U.C.C. does not provide
specifically for the rights and liabilities of those who are not parties to the
transaction but who are engaged solely in providing transfer or data
processing services. 56 The two communications systems that process the
bulk of international interbank transactions today are the Clearing
House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) and the Society for World-
wide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). 5 7 Each of these
systems has developed its own methods for allocating rights and liabili-
ties among parties for such losses that are caused by failure or delay in
transmission, faulty information or equipment, and fraud. 58
Although it is difficult to apply specific provisions of the U.C.C. di-
50 U.C.C. § 4-10 4(1)(g) (1977).
51 See, e.g., H. ScoTr, NEW PAYMENT SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO THE 3-4-8 COMMITTEE OF
THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 47 (1978).
52 Id.
53 See U.C.C. §§ 3-201, 3-202, 3-301, 3-305, 3-306 (1977).
54 See id § 4-303.
55 See H. ScoTr, supra note 51, at 88. For a recent case holding that payments made via
the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) were irrevocable, see in/ia text accom-
panying notes 64-69. The process of effecting payment under the U.C.C. and the process under
the electronic fund transfer systems are different. Situations governed by the U.C.C. involve the
transfer of paper items that are used to produce or substantiate debits and credits throughout
the collection process. One can now send a check to a distant payee on the 25th of the month
and wait until the end of the month to replenish the account since the payee will not present the
item for payment until then. In an electronic fund transfer the accounts are debited and
credited instantaneously as the funds are sent through the system. See J. WHITE, TEACHING
MATERIALS ON BANKING LAW 700 (1976).
56 R. ZIMMER & T. EINHORN, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER 46 (1980).
57 Comment, Risk Allocaton in International Interbank Electronic Fund Transfers. CHIPS &
SWIFT, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 621, 621-22 (1981).
58 Id at 630-31.
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rectly to electronic fund transfers, it has been suggested that the underly-
ing principles of the U.C.C. can be applied by analogy. 59 One
commentator suggests that if the U.C.C. were applied by analogy, almost
all of the risk allocations as set out by the rules of the CHIPS and
SWIFT systems would be upheld.60 Article 4 provisions "may be varied
by agreement except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsi-
bility for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care."
61
U.C.C. § 4-103(2) gives effect to "Federal Reserve regulations and oper-
ating letters, clearing house rules and the like . . . whether or not specifi-
cally assented to by all parties interested in items handled."'62 Professor
Scott has stated that the U.C.C. principle that the risk of mistake should
lie with the party making the mistake, or that the risk of fraud should lie
with the party best able to insure against it could be applied to any pay-
ment system.63
The case of Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 64 illus-
trates the application of U.C.C. provisions and principles in a situation
involving an electronic fund transfer. Delbrueck and Co. (Delbrueck)
was a German banking house that maintained an account with Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co. (Manufacturers), a New York banking cor-
poration. Delbrueck had entered into three foreign exchange contracts
with Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt (Herstatt), one for $2.5 million and one for
$10 million, both due on June 26, 1974, and one for $10 million due on
June 27, 1974. In accordance with standard procedure, Delbrueck
telexed Manufacturers on June 25 ordering the transfer of the $12.5 mil-
lion to Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase) for the account of Herstatt. On
June 26, Delbrueck authorized the payment of the $10 million due on
June 27.
At 10:30 A.M. on June 26, the German banking authorities closed
Herstatt. Delbrueck immediately sent a telex to Manufacturers to stop
payment on the last $10 million. Manufacturers stopped payment on the
$10 million, but transferred to Chase via the CHIPS system the two ear-
lier payments of $12.5 million. After Manufacturers had made the pay-
ment, Delbrueck called and attempted to stop payment of the $12.5
million as well. The attempts were unsuccessful, and Chase formally
credited Herstatt's account with the $12.5 million.
Delbrueck sued Manufacturers alleging negligence and breach of
59 See, e.g., Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d
Cir. 1979).
60 See Comment, supra note 57, at 654.
61 U.C.C. § 4-103(l) (1977).
62 Id. § 4-103(2). "Other agencies or associations may be established in the future whose
rules and regulations could be appropriately looked on as constituting a means of avoiding
absolute statutory rigidity. The phrase 'and the like' leaves open such possibilities for future
development." Id Comment 3.
63 H. SCorr, supra note 51, at 89.
64 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
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contract for failing to revoke the two payments. 65 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the payments of $12.5 million were irrevoca-
ble.66 Although the CHIPS system had no specific rule concerning the
finality of transfers, the court reasoned that member banks viewed the
transaction as irrevocable due to the nature and speed of the system it-
self.6 7 The court analogized the situation to the U.C.C. concept of the
finality of accepted checks to support the decision. 68 The court also
deemed the deposits choses in action under the common law, and held
that as such they were validly assignable.
69
The court in Evra did not analogize, as did the Delbrueck court, to
banking principles found under the U.C.C. Instead, the court refused to
allow the recovery of lost profits based on the common-law rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale ,70 the well-known case that limits the recovery of special
damages in a breach of contract action. In Hadley, a mill owner sued a
carrier for lost profits after the carrier delayed the return of a mill shaft
which the owner had sent out to be repaired. The court held that the
mill owner was not entitled to recover the lost profits because he did not
inform the carrier of the special circumstances giving rise to the dam-
age. 71 The court set out two principles governing the recovery of special
damages in a brech of contract action. First, special damages are recov-
erable if they arise naturally from the breach of contract. 72 Second, spe-
cial damages are recoverable if they were within the contemplation of
the parties at the time the contract was made, that is, if they were fore-
seeable.73 The principles set out in Hadley v. Baxendale are followed widely
by the courts in the United States, their major focus being on the concept
of foreseeability. 74 The courts have applied the requirement of foresee-
ability strictly and have often refused recovery when the damages
seemed likely.
75
The well-known tort concept of foreseeability also seeks to limit the
recovery of special damages to those which are a foreseeable consequence
of a defendant's carelessness. The tort concept of foreseeability is set out
in the famous case of Palsgrafv. Long IslandR. Co. 76 In Palsgraf, a passen-
ger was running to catch one of the defendant's trains. The defendant's
employee, while assisting the boarding passenger, dislodged a package
containing fireworks. The package fell onto the rails and exploded. The
65 Id at 1049.
66 Id at 1052.
67 Id. at 1051. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
71 Id at 355, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
72 Id at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
73 Id
74 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 805 (1973).
75 Id.
76 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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plaintiff, who was some distance away, was injured by some scales that
overturned as a result of the explosion. The jury found that the defend-
ant's employees had been negligent, 77 but the court held that there was
no liability because there was no negligence directed toward the plain-
tiff.78 Courts have utilized the principle of foreseeability as set out in
Palsgraf to limit the recovery of special damages in tort actions, but the
foreseeability rule in tort imposes a much wider liability than the foresee-
ability rule in contract. The disparity can be attributed to the fact that
in contract, a party has the opportunity to protect himself from an unu-
sual risk by communicating the risk to the other party. In tort, an in-
jured plaintiff does not have the same opportunity to protect himself.79
The Evra court relied on common-law principles to limit plaintiff's
recovery of consequential damages in an interbank electronic fund trans-
fer because there was no specific statutory authority to govern this partic-
ular electronic fund transfer situation. The case is consistent with many
courts' strict application of the Hadley rule and their general reluctance
to award special damages for breach of contract in a commercial situa-
tion.80 Although the Evra court refused to apply the U.C.C. either di-
rectly or by analogy, the result is also consistent with U.C.C. § 4-103(5),
which precludes the recovery of consequential damages unless a bank is
acting in -bad faith.8 1 The result in Evra is sound since the risk of loss is
efficiently allocated to the party best able to insure against it.82
The major obstacle that the court faced in Evra was in attempting to
apply the strict rule of Hadley v. Baxendale to a factual situation where it
could find no express contract. In order to solve the problem and bring
the case under the rule of Hadley, the court found it necessary to make a
series of inferences that are tenuous at best. The court relied on Siegal
and noted that in that case, the defendant had been guilty of both negli-
gence and breach of contract but that the court did not extend the de-
fendant's liability to the broader set of consequences in tort. Based on
this fact, the court concluded that the defendant's liability in Evra should
also be limited.8 3 The court's analysis simply begs the question, however,
since the distinction to be made is that there was a contract in Siegal by
which to limit damages. In contrast, the court in Evra did not find an
express contract.
77 Id.
78 Id at 346, 162 N.E. at 101.
79 See D. DOBBs, supra note 74, at 804 n.24. "[Ilt is clear that what is 'foreseeable' in a tort
case may not be 'foreseeable' in a contract case, and a defendant may find himself liable for a
given item of damage on the ground that it is foreseeable where he is sued for tort, but not liable
for the same item of damage where he is sued in contract." Id
80 See id "Hadley is important-and revealing-in the way the principle is applied ....
[M]any courts happily followed its niggardly refusal to award special damages, even where such
damages seemed clearly normal and expectable." 1d. at 804-05.
81 U.C.C. § 4-103(5) (1977).
82 See Comment, supra note 57, at 650 (discussing the district court opinion in Evra).
83 673 F.2d at 957.
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After a strained analysis that brought the case within the rule of
Hadley, the court continued to apply both tort and contract principles to
deny the recoyery of consequential damages. For instance, in order to
deny recovery by Hyman-Michaels, the Evra court relied on the contract
rule as applied in Siegal that general foreseeability is not enough for the
recovery of special damages.8 4 The court then turned to the tort concept
of foreseeability to determine that the circumstances surrounding Hy-
man-Michael's contract were too remote from Swiss Bank's practical
range of knowledge. More than likely the court was simply using the
rules of both tort and contract to limit the recovery of special damages
and bring about the desired result of a denial of recovery. As Professor
Dobbs states:
The test of foreseeability [in Hadley] has little or no meaning. The idea is
so readily subject to expansion or contraction that it becomes in fact
merely a technical way in which the judges can state their conclu-
sion. . . . Everyone else might disagree, but no one could prove the
judges wrong, since the question is not one that can be resolved by a
scientific test.
85
The application of common-law principles, therefore, may give rise to a
wide variety of results.
The decision in Evra is consistent with modern banking principles
governing the recovery of special damages. The court, however, is taking
the risk that future decisions will not be consistent with modern banking
principles since the application of common-law principles may give rise
to a wide variety of results. The better approach by the court in Evra
would have been to follow the example in Delbrueck. In Delbrueck, the
court looked to the nature of the transaction itself and applied by anal-
ogy the U.C.C. concept of the finality of checks once accepted to find
that payments made by wire transfer were irrevocable.8 6 The court then
turned to the common law to support its decision.8 7
Rather than relying exclusively on common-law principles to deny
recovery, the Evra court could have applied U.C.C. § 4-103(5) by anal-
ogy. Section 4-103(5) precludes the recovery of consequential damages
in the absence of bad faith. 88 The court then could have turned to Hadley
v. Baxendale to support the decision. Although there was no express con-
tract between Hyman-Michaels and Swiss Bank, it was unnecessary for
the court to resort to the strained analysis under Siegal to bring the case
within the contract rule of Hadley. The court could have concluded
84 Id.
85 D. DOBBS, supra note 74, at 814.
86 609 F.2d at 1051. Professor Scott has suggested, however, that a strict application of
Article 4 making the time to stop payment turn fortuitously on the speed of the collection is
outdated. H. ScoTr, supra note 51, at 88-89.
87 609 F.2d at 1051.
88 For a more recent case analogizing to the U.C.C., see tnra note 89 and accompanying
text.
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either that Swiss Bank was Hyman-Michaels' agent, 89 or that Hyman-
Michaels was a third-party beneficiary under a contract between Conti-
nental and Swiss Bank.9° This approach would have been less compli-
cated because it would have been unnecessary for the court to utilize
common-law tort principles. It would also insure that future cases simi-
lar to those in Evra would be decided under consistent banking principles
as governed by the U.C.C.91
The issue that the Evra court addressed was difficult because there
was no law governing electronic fund transfers that applied directly to
the factual situation. The Delbrueck court faced the same problem. Since
courts are just beginning to address the issue of rights and liabilities
under electronic fund transfers, the problem will continue to arise. The
drafters of the U.C.C. are currently considering a model draft which ad-
dresses the issue of the rights and liabilities of participants in electronic
fund transfer systems. 92 Also, it has been suggested that there should be
89 Under Illinois law, an agency relationship may be implied from the facts of the particu-
lar case and need not be express. The existence of an agency relationship may be shown by
reference to the situation of the parties, the property, and the acts of the parties. Kalman v.
Bertacchi, 57 Ill. App. 3d 542, 548, 373 N.E.2d 550, 556 (1978).
90 Under Illinois law the test for determining whether a contract is for the benefit of a
third party is whether the benefit is direct or incidental. If the benefit is direct, he may sue
under contract; if it is incidental, he may not sue. Midwest Concrete Prod. Co. v. LaSalle Nat'l
Bank, 94 III. App. 3d 394, 396, 418 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1981).
91 For a more recent application of agency and third-party beneficiary theories in an elec-
tronic fund transfer, see Security Fund Servs. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 542 F. Supp.
323 (N.D. I1. 1982). Security Fund Services (SFS) processed and recorded the purchases and
redemptions of the shares of Templeton Growth Fund Ltd. (Templeton). One of Templeton's
shareholders was John Bushman who was trustee for approximately 260,000 shares valued at 52
million. On October 14, 1980, SFS received instructions bearing John Bushman's signature,
requesting that his shares be redeemed and the proceeds wired to his account at American
National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago (ANB). Bushman's signature had been forged,
and ANB did not have an account in the name of John Bushman. ANB credited the funds to
another account, however, and when the forgery was discovered, SFS paid for and reissued the
redeemed shares to the trustee. SFS brought suit against ANB for the price of the shares alleg-
ing nine causes of action. One count alleged that ANB was an agent of Templeton's custodian,
the New England Merchants National Bank of Boston (NEMB); the other alleged that SFS was
a third-party beneficiary under the contract between NEMB and ANB. On ANB's motion to
dismiss, the district court held that an agency relationship existed and that SFS adequately
pleaded its status as a third-party beneficiary. In determining that an agency relationship ex-
isted, the court did not follow the court of appeals' refusal in Evra to apply the U.C.C. by
analogy. Instead the court cited the district court decision in Evra to analogize the U.C.C.
concept of a collecting bank to Swiss Bank's role as a correspondent bank. The court in Securities
FundServtces then drew an analogy between SFS and the concept of a customer under § 4-103(e)
of the U.C.C. and held that ANB owed a duty of care to SFS in handling the wire transfer. The
court noted that the Seventh Circuit in Evra had reversed the award of damages because gen-
eral foreseeability was insufficient to support an award of consequential damages. The court
concluded that the case in Securities FundServices was different, however, because direct damages,
rather than consequential damages, were being sought. Id at 327.
92 See ZIMMER & EINHORN, supra note 56, at 49-50. The Permanent Editorial Board for
the U.C.C. approved recommendations from the 3-4-8 Committee that the Committee should
begin drafting a Comprehensive Payments Code that would include all other methods of pay-
ment other than cash and would replace, amend or supplement Articles 3 and 4 of the Code.
The Board recommended that the new Code not be limited to banks and their customers and
that rules governing transactions that did not affect the rights of customers (bank-to-bank or
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an international codification of rules regarding electronic fund trans-
fers. 93 Until such time as there are applicable standards to govern situa-
tions similar to Evra, courts should attempt to develop sound and
consistent laws that are in keeping with established banking principles.
LINDA TEAL
bank-to-merchant transactions) should be subject to variation by private agreements. Although
the 3-4-8 Committee has officially resolved to create a new Comprehensive Payments Code,
much work remains to be done before any new legislation can be expected. Id The 3-4-8
Committee has now completed and circulated a preliminary draft of the Comprehensive Pay-
ment Code. Telephone interview with Paul Wolfkin, American Law Institute (April 6, 1983).
93 See Comment supra note 57 at 655.

